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1. Introduction
1.1 Overview
Unanimous juries date back to fourteenth-century English common law and have become
the American standard during the colonial period. Louisiana was the rst to revolutionize
the system. In 1928, it authorized a supermajority of 10 out of 12 jurors to acquit or convict
in felony trials. Six years later, Oregon ensued with a section in its state constitution allowing
for verdicts when ve-sixths of a jury in a criminal trial agree. While murder defendants can
most always be convicted solely by unanimous juries comprised of 12 jurors, civil cases in
the U.S. portray an entirely dierent picture. 39 state courts have reduced the size of civil
juries to 6, 7, 8, or 10 persons. Non-unanimous decision rules are utilized in 30 state courts
and range from 2/3 majority, to 3/4 majority, to 5/6 majority, to 7/8 majority.1
The structure of jury decision making has long been the center of many political and legal
debates (see Kalven and Zeisel [1966] and Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington [1983]). Recently,
there has been a mushrooming of economic analysis of jury decision making, and more
generally, of strategic voting behavior (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks [1996], Myerson
[1998], and Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1996, 1997, 1998]). The approach the economic
literature has taken follows that of Condorcet [1785]. Broadly speaking, each juror receives an
independent piece of information concerning the guilt of the defendant and subsequently casts
her vote. Since the juror's vote matters only when she is pivotal, a strategic juror considers
the information contained in the event of pivotality, taking into account her fellow jurors'
strategies. There are two sets of conclusions this literature has produced. First, unanimity
is expected to perform worse than non unanimous voting rules. Second, as jury size becomes
innitely large, non unanimous voting rules fully aggregate the available information and
generate ecient outcomes.
1See State Court Organization 1998, U.S. Department of Justice, Oce of Justice Programs, available
online at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco98.pdf
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Surprisingly, two elements are missing from most of the prior theoretical discussion. The
rst is the fundamental fact of pre-vote deliberation. The second is the absence of comparison
among non-unanimous voting rules (majority and dierent forms of supermajority), despite
the prevalence of these rules in U.S. jurisdiction.2
The goal of the current paper is to explore the potential eects of deliberations on out-
comes generated by a wide range of voting rules. We point to a broad array of environments,
encompassing the standard jury setup, in which deliberations render a large class of (non
unanimous) voting institutions equivalent in terms of the sets of (sequential) equilibrium
outcomes they generate.3
We nd our theoretical observations interesting in that they illustrate the importance
of modeling deliberations in collective choice environments. In particular, any venture to
explain the variance of dierent voting schemes observed in U.S. civil courts would necessitate
structural assumptions on the protocols of jury deliberations.
In more detail, we start by considering a general version of the standard jury and strate-
gic voting models. A jury of nite size faces a decision to acquit or convict a defendant.
Each juror has a private type, corresponding to her private information and her personal
preferences (e.g., her interpretation of what reasonable doubt means). We rst concentrate
on threshold voting rules. These are rules under which the defendant is convicted only if
a certain threshold number of jurors favor conviction (corresponding to the rules prevail-
ing in the U.S. court system). When communication is prohibited, dierent voting rules
may generate dierent equilibrium outcomes (see Example 2). We investigate whether such
dierences between voting rules persist when the jurors can communicate with one another.
Our approach departs from the existing literature on deliberations and voting (Cough-
lan [2000], Austen-Smith and Feddersen [2002a,b], and Doraszelski, Gerardi and Squintani
[2003], among others) in that we do not impose any restriction on the communication pro-
tocol. Indeed, there are many dierent plausible communication procedures. For example,
2An exception is Persico [2004] who analyzes the optimal voting rule when private information is costly.
3An outcome species a random alternative (for example, acquittal or conviction) in every state of the
world.
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there can be one or several rounds of communication, individuals can exchange public or
private messages, etc. In principle, dierent communication protocols may induce dierent
outcomes. Thus, comparisons of voting rules may be sensitive to the particular specication
of the communication procedure. Instead of focusing on a given protocol, in this paper we
allow for any form of communication by formally adding a cheap talk stage prior to the vot-
ing stage. For any voting rule we consider the set of all outcomes that can be implemented
with some procedure of communication.
Our rst result shows that when deliberations occur, regardless of the information and
preferences structure, all decision rules excluding the two types of unanimity rules (one
requiring a unanimous consensus to acquit, one requiring a unanimous consensus to convict)
generate the same set of equilibrium outcomes. Furthermore, under a unanimous voting rule
it is possible to generate only a smaller set of outcomes.
To see the intuition behind this result, suppose an outcome is implementable under a
certain voting rule. We show that the same outcome can be implemented with the follow-
ing protocol and strategies. At the deliberation stage the jurors determine collectively the
alternative to select. Then, they all vote in favor of it. In other words, the outcome is im-
plemented with a strategy prole under which there is always unanimous consensus. Given
these strategies, a juror does not have any incentive to deviate at the voting stage if the
voting rule is non unanimous. In fact, her vote is never pivotal.
Consider the communication protocol and the voting strategies that we have just de-
scribed. Of course, to determine whether an outcome is implementable or not, we need to
consider the incentives of every juror to reveal her information during deliberations. These
incentives depend on how the juror's information aects the collective choice. The incen-
tives, however, do not depend on the voting rule. The equivalence result for non unanimous
voting rules follows. Clearly, a unilateral deviation at the voting stage may be benecial
when unanimity is required. This is why unanimous rules yield smaller sets of equilibrium
outcomes than those generated by intermediate voting rules.
The intuitive outline of the equivalence result suggests that a juror might nd herself
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voting (together with the rest of the jurors) for the alternative she least prefers, simply be-
cause her unilateral deviation will not alter the ultimate collective decision. Formally, this
may raise the suspicion that the equivalence result hinges on jurors using weakly dominated
strategies. On the contrary, we show that under rather weak restrictions on jurors' prefer-
ences, the equivalence result holds even when jurors do not use weakly dominated strategies.
These restrictions rule out situations in which jurors are blind partisans of one of the alter-
natives and are keen to select that alternative regardless of the realization of types. This is
in line with the process of voir dire exercised in the selection of American juries. Voir dire
is used to eliminate jurors that may be unable to consider the case at hand fairly, based
only on the evidence presented in court. Therefore, by and large, the restrictions we suggest
should hold in practice. Furthermore, these restrictions are, in fact, satised by the bulk of
the theoretical voting models analyzed in the literature.
As for generality, the equivalence result extends beyond its manifestation in the jury
setup. In fact, the equivalence stretches directly to situations in which there are more than
two alternatives. In Section 4 we consider all voting structures that are comprised of actions
and voting rules. The action sets can be arbitrary (e.g., selected alternatives, ranking orders
of all of the alternatives, etc.). The equivalence result holds as long as the voting rules in
question are veto-free. That is, for any alternative there is a prole of feasible actions that
yields that alternative via the voting rule, and is robust to any unilateral deviation. The
class of veto-free voting rules contains most of the voting rules discussed in the literature
(see, e.g. Cox [1987]). For example, plurality rule, Borda rule, and Condorcet winner's
selection method (for more than two alternatives) are veto-free. Specically, we show that
for any xed set of alternatives, all veto-free voting structures are equivalent with respect to
the equilibrium outcomes they generate. Furthermore, non veto-free structures yield sets of
equilibrium outcomes that are subsets of those corresponding to the veto-free structures.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 overviews the related literature.
Section 2 describes the general setup of a deliberating jury's decision making and provides
the preliminary comparison between dierent threshold voting rules. Section 3 species the
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robustness of the equivalence results with respect to the communication protocols (Section
3.1) and with respect to the jurors' strategies (Section 3.2). Section 4 demonstrates the
generalized equivalence result pertaining to any set of alternatives. Section 5 concludes.
Most proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
1.2 Literature Review
While the literature on strategic voting with communication is still in its inception, there
are a few recent contributions that relate to the current paper. Coughlan [2000] adds a
straw poll preceding the voting stage in a private information, two alternative environment.
He shows that voters reveal their information truthfully if and only if their preferences are
suciently close. Austen-Smith and Feddersen are among the rst to put forward dierent
models of deliberative committees. Austen-Smith and Feddersen [2002a] consider commit-
tees of three agents who need to choose one of two alternatives. Each agent has private
information on two dimensions: perfect information concerning her preferences and noisy
information concerning the state of the world. They model deliberations as a one-round
process in which all agents simultaneously send public messages. The restriction to this
particular form of communication allows them to consider an equilibrium concept (reminis-
cent of trembling hand perfection) stronger than the notion we use (sequential equilibrium in
weakly undominated strategies). They show that when such deliberations precede the voting
stage, majority rule induces more information sharing and fewer decision-making errors than
unanimity. Austen-Smith and Feddersen [2002b] look at a similar environment in which any
number of agents can publicly send arbitrary messages before casting their votes. They pro-
vide conditions under which unanimity cannot induce full revelation of private information
in equilibria comprised of weakly undominated strategies. Furthermore, if full revelation is
possible under unanimity, then it is possible under any other rule. Doraszelski, Gerardi and
Squintani [2003] study a two-player model with communication and voting. Preferences are
heterogenous (not necessarily aligned) and private information. They show that some, but
not all, information is transmitted in equilibrium, and that communication is benecial.
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In a similar vein, there has been some experimental work on voting with communication.
Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey [2000] constructed an experiment replicating Cough-
lan's [2000] setup. They noted that during deliberations, voters tend to expose their private
information but not to the full extent as predicted by Coughlan's [2000] results.
Blinder and Morgan [2000] conducted a conceptually dierent experiment in which groups
were required to solve two problems - a statistical urn problem and a monetary policy puzzle.
The groups could converse before casting their votes using either majority rule or unanimity.
They found no signicant dierence in the decision lag when group decisions were made by
majority rule relative to when they were made under a unanimity requirement.
The idea that communication may render a class of institutions equivalent appears in
Matthews and Postlewaite [1989] who compare all two-person double auctions and show
that they generate the same sets of equilibrium outcomes when the bidders can communicate
before submitting their bids.
2. Deliberative Voting with Two Alternatives
2.1 Setup
A jury of n > 3 members has to choose one of two alternatives: A (acquit) or C (convict).4
Each juror i has a type ti which is private information. The type ti can capture juror i's
preferences, her private knowledge of each of the alternatives' consequences, etc. We let Ti
denote the set of types of juror i, and assume that it is nite. T =
Qn
i=1 Ti denotes the set of
proles of types, and p is the probability distribution over T: To simplify the exposition and
avoid a few technical issues, we assume that the probability distribution p has full support
(that is, p (t) > 0 for every type prole t in T ).5 A juror's utility depends on the prole of
types and the chosen alternative. Formally, for each juror i there exists a utility function
ui : fA;Cg  T ! R.
4While our terminology follows closely that of the standard jury models, of course the same setup can
be used for any environment in which a committee selects one of two alternatives. Section 4 extends the
analysis to more general voting environments (more than two alternatives, and arbitrary voting rules).
5Most of our results do not depend on the full support assumption. In particular, Propositions 1 and 2
hold for any probability distribution.
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This setup encompasses the strategic voting models that have been commonly analyzed in
the literature (see, for instance, Austen-Smith and Banks [1996] or Feddersen and Pesendorfer
[1998]). We shall often use (a simple version of) the standard voting setup to illustrate our
results, as described in the example below.
Example 1 (the standard jury setup) A jury of n individuals has to determine the fate
of a defendant. There are two states, I (the defendant is innocent) andG (the defendant
is guilty), with prior probabilities P (I) and P (G) ; respectively.
Juror i's preferences are given by:
bui (C;G) = bui (A; I) = 0; bui (A;G) =   (1  qi) ; bui (C; I) =  qi;
where qi 2 (0; 1) denotes juror i's threshold of reasonable doubt (capturing her concern
for convicting the innocent relative to that for acquitting the innocent).
Each agent i observes a signal ti 2 fI;Gg of accuracy : That is,
Pr (ti = IjI) = Pr (ti = GjG) = :
Conditional on the state, signals are independent across jurors. Let T = fI;Ggn denote
the set of proles of signals.
Clearly, the utility function ui : fA;Cg  T ! R of juror i is given by:
ui (A; t) =   (1  qi) Pr (Gjt) ;
ui (C; t) =  qi Pr (Ijt) :
Note that the setup studied in this paper is more general than that of the standard model
in that types can be taken from arbitrary sets, and there are essentially no restrictions on
the prior distribution over types. In particular, types may be correlated across individuals.
As for the choice of the defendant's fate, jurors select an alternative by voting. Each juror
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can vote to acquit, a; or to convict, c:6 We let Vi = fa; cg denote the set of actions available
to juror i; and V = fa; cgn the set of action proles. Under the voting rule r = 1; : : : ; n; the
alternative C is selected if and only if r or more jurors vote to convict.
Given a voting rule r and a prole of votes v; we let  r (v) denote the jury's decision.
Formally,  r : V ! fA;Cg is dened as follows:
 r (v) =
(
A if j fi : vi = cg j < r;
C if j fi : vi = cg j > r:
The voting rule r denes the following voting game Gr: Nature selects a prole of types
in T according to the probability distribution p; then jurors learn their types, after which
they vote simultaneously. If the proles of types and actions are t and v; respectively, juror
i obtains ui ( r (v) ; t) :
7
In general, the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponding to the game Gr does not
coincide with the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponding to the game Gr0 , where r 6= r0,
as the following example illustrates.
Example 2 Consider the standard jury setup with n = 4: Assume that the two states are
equally likely, P (I) = P (G) ; and that the accuracy of the signal is  = 3=4: Lastly,
suppose that q1 = q2 = 2=5 and q3 = q4 = 3=5:
Let  (k0; k) denote the posterior probability that the defendant is guilty when k0
out of k jurors observe the guilty signal G: It is easy to check that  (1; 4) = 1=10;
 (2; 4) = 1=2 and  (3; 4) = 9=10: It follows that jurors 1 and 2 require only two of the
four signals to indicate guilt in order to nd the defendant culpable, whereas jurors 3
and 4 require at least three guilty signals. Notice that there is disagreement among
the jurors when exactly three signals indicate guilt.
Consider the voting game G2 and the following strategy prole. The rst three jurors
6The case in which jurors can also choose to abstain is covered by the analysis provided in Section 4.
7Note that, as is standard in the voting literature, we assume that a juror's utility depends on the outcome
of the vote, but not on the particular vote prole that generated the outcome.
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vote informatively (i.e., they vote to acquit if they observe I and to convict if they
observe G), whereas juror 4 votes to acquit regardless of her signal. This strategy prole
constitutes a (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium of G2: First, consider juror i = 1; 2; 3: The
probability that the defendant is guilty given that juror i observes signal ti and her
vote is pivotal is equal to
Pr (Gjti and i is pivotal) =
8><>:
 (1; 3) = 1=4 < qi if ti = I
 (2; 3) = 3=4 > qi if ti = G
Clearly, juror i has an incentive to vote according to her signal. For juror 4 we have
Pr (Gjt4 and 4 is pivotal) =
8><>:
 (1; 4) = 1=10 < q4 if t4 = I
 (2; 4) = 1=2 < q4 if t4 = G
In both cases, juror 4 prefers to vote to acquit.
The above equilibrium implements the outcome  : fI;Gg4 !  fA;Cg under which
the alternative C is chosen if at least two of the rst three jurors receive the signal G.
However,  is not an equilibrium outcome of the voting game G3: In fact, under the
voting rule r = 3;  can be implemented only if the rst three jurors vote informatively
and juror 4 votes to convict regardless of her signal. But this strategy prole does not
constitute an equilibrium of G3. In particular, consider juror 4 and suppose that she
observes signal I. The probability that the defendant is guilty when her vote is pivotal
is equal to  (2; 4) = 1=2 < q4: It follows that juror 4 has an incentive to deviate and
vote to acquit.
The focus of the paper is the comparison of dierent voting rules when jurors are allowed
to deliberate before casting their votes. We model deliberations by adding cheap talk to
the voting game Gr: A cheap talk extension of Gr is an extensive-form game in which the
jurors, after learning their types, exchange messages. At the last stage of the game, the
jurors vote. Payos depend on the jurors' types and votes, but not on their messages. For
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technical simplicity, it will be useful to start by assuming that that there exists an impartial
mediator who helps the jurors communicate. This assumption will be dropped later on in
Section 3.1.8
A strategy prole  of a cheap talk extension of Gr induces an outcome, i.e., a mapping
 from the set of types T into the interval [0; 1].  (t) denotes the probability that the
defendant is convicted when the prole of types is t (and the jurors adopt the strategy
prole ). We let  r denote the set of outcomes induced by sequential equilibria of cheap
talk extensions of Gr:
The notion of communication equilibrium (Myerson [1982], Forges [1986]) allows us to
characterize the set  r: As is standard, we denote by  (V ) the set of probability distribu-
tions over the set of action proles V: A mapping  from T into  (V ) is a communication
equilibrium of Gr if and only if the following inequalities hold:
9
P
t i2T i
p (t ijti)
P
v2V
 (vjt)ui ( r (v) ; t) >
P
t i2T i
p (t ijti)
P
v2V
 (vjt i; t0i)ui ( r (v i;  (vi)) ; t)
8i = 1; : : : ; n; 8 (ti; t0i) 2 T 2i ; 8 : fa; cg ! fa; cg :
(1)
Intuitively, consider the following cheap talk extension of the voting game Gr: All ju-
rors report their types to the mediator. Suppose that the prole of reports is t: Then the
mediator selects an action prole randomly, according to the probability distribution  (t) ;
and informs each juror of her own action. Finally, the jurors vote. The inequalities in (1)
guarantee that the cheap talk extension admits a sequential equilibrium in which two types
of incentive constraints hold: 1. all jurors are sincere; and 2. all jurors obey the mediator's
recommendations.
It follows from the argument above that any communication equilibrium induces an
outcome in  r: The revelation principle (Myerson [1982]) assures that  r contains, in fact,
8For a formal denition of cheap talk extensions to arbitrary games see Myerson [1991].
9As usual, T i denotes the set of types of players other than i:
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only outcomes that are induced by communication equilibria.10 In particular, the set  r
coincides with the set of outcomes induced by communication equilibria of Gr. Let V
C
r
denote the set of proles of votes that lead to conviction under the voting rule r: Formally,
V Cr = fv 2 V :  r (v) = Cg : Then we have:
 r = f : T ! [0; 1] j9 a communication equilibrium  of Gr
such that  (t) =
P
v2V Cr
 (vjt) for every t 2 Tg:
2.2 A Preliminary Result
The goal of this section is to compare dierent voting rules when the jurors can commu-
nicate. We start with a simple example which suggests that communication may render two
dierent voting rules similar in terms of the outcomes that they implement.
Example 3 Consider the environment of Example 2. Recall that  denotes the outcome
under which the defendant is convicted if at least two of the rst three jurors observe
the signal G. Recall also that  is an equilibrium outcome of the voting game G2 but
not of G3:
We now show that  can be also implemented with the voting rule r = 3 when commu-
nication is allowed. Consider the following communication protocol. All jurors report
their signal to the mediator, who then dispels unanimous recommendations that im-
plement : That is, the mediator recommends the action c to every juror if at least two
of the rst three jurors report signal G. In all other cases, the mediator recommends
the action a to every juror.
The strategy prole in which all jurors are truthful and obedient is a sequential equi-
librium of the voting game with communication. Notice that the mediator ignores the
10Indeed, the original revelation principle extends directly to sequential (rather than Bayesian) equilibria
in our setup under the assumption of full support of the prior distribution p:
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signal of juror 4 and that  represents the optimal outcome for all jurors when only
three signals are available. It follows that for juror i = 1; 2; 3 it is strictly optimal to
play the equilibrium strategy (see Example 2). Finally, consider juror 4. First, suppose
that she receives the recommendation a: The posterior probability that the defendant
is guilty is equal to
Pr (Gjt4 and at least two opponents observed I) =
8><>:
5=86 < q4 if t4 = I
5=14 < q4 if t4 = G
;
Suppose now that juror 4 receives the recommendation c: The posterior probability
that the defendant is guilty is equal to
Pr (Gjt4 and at least two opponents observed G) =
8><>:
9=14 > q4 if t4 = I
81=86 > q4 if t4 = G
;
It follows that juror 4 always has a strict incentive to obey the mediator's recommen-
dation.
Thus, while unilateral deviations are inconsequential at the voting stage of our game
with communication, the jurors are, in fact, using undominated strategies. This ob-
servation will be expanded on in Section 3.2.
We are now ready to generalize the above example and compare the sets  r and  r0 for
two dierent voting rules r and r0: In Proposition 1 we show that, except for the voting rules
r = 1 and r = n;11 all other \intermediate" rules are equivalent. If jurors can communicate,
every outcome that can be implemented with a voting rule r 6= 1; n can also be implemented
with a dierent voting rule r0 6= 1; n: Furthermore, by adopting an extreme voting rule (r = 1
or r = n), we cannot enlarge the set of equilibrium outcomes.
11The voting rules r = 1 and r = n are the only rules which require a unanimous consensus in order to
adopt a certain alternative (A if r = 1; C if r = n).
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Proposition 1  2 = : : : =  n 1: Moreover,  1   2 and  n   2; and these inclusions
may be strict.
Proof:
Consider any voting rule r = 1; : : : ; n: The rst step of our proof is to show that if 
belongs to  r then  satises the following inequalities:P
t i2T i
p (t ijti) [ (t)ui (C; t) + (1   (t))ui (A; t)] >P
t i2T i
p (t ijti) [ (t i; t0i)ui (C; t) + (1   (t i; t0i))ui (A; t)]
8i = 1; : : : ; n; 8 (ti; t0i) 2 T 2i :
(2)
If  is in  r; there exists a communication equilibrium  of Gr that induces : For every
juror i and for every pair (ti; t
0
i) we therefore have:P
t i2T i
p (t ijti) [ (t)ui (C; t) + (1   (t))ui (A; t)] =P
t i2T i
p (t ijti) [(
P
v2V Cr
 (vjt))ui (C; t) + (1 
P
v2V Cr
 (vjt))ui (A; t)] =P
t i2T i
p (t ijti)
P
v2V
 (vjt)ui ( r (v) ; t) >
P
t i2T i
p (t ijti)
P
v2V
 (vjt i; t0i)ui ( r (v) ; t) =P
t i2T i
p (t ijti) [(
P
v2V Cr
 (vjt i; t0i))ui (C; t) + (1 
P
v2V Cr
 (vjt i; t0i))ui (A; t)] =P
t i2T i
p (t ijti) [ (t i; t0i)ui (C; t) + (1   (t i; t0i))ui (A; t)] ;
where the inequality follows from the truth-telling constraints of the communication equi-
librium :
Consider now a voting rule r = 2; : : : ; n 1:We demonstrate that if  : T ! [0; 1] satises
inequality (2), then  belongs to  r: Given ; consider the following mapping ~ from T into
 (V ) :
~ (vjt) =
8><>:
 (t) if v = (c; : : : ; c) ;
1   (t) if v = (a; : : : ; a) ;
0 otherwise.
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Obviously, ~ induces : It is easy to show that ~ is a communication equilibrium of Gr:
First of all, no juror has an incentive to disobey the mediator's recommendation. Indeed,
when the mediator follows ~; she makes the same recommendation to all jurors. A juror's
vote cannot change the nal outcome if all her opponents are obedient (notice that we are
not considering r = 1 and r = n). Furthermore, the fact that  satises inequality (2)
implies that no juror has an incentive to lie to the mediator when her opponents are sincere.
We conclude that  2; : : : ; n 1 coincide with the set of the mappings from T into [0; 1]
which satisfy inequality (2). Moreover, this set contains  1 and  n:
We now show that the inclusions  1   2 and  n   2 may be strict. Indeed, consider
rst the unanimity rule r = n. Any outcome in  n can be implemented with a commu-
nication equilibrium in which the mediator sends the same recommendation to all jurors.
This guarantees that no juror has an incentive to disobey recommendation a. Of course, the
action prole (c; : : : ; c) is necessary to convict the defendant under the unanimity rule. If a
juror does not follow recommendation c the nal decision will be A (in this case the juror's
message is irrelevant). Thus, an outcome  : T ! [0; 1] satises the obedience constraints if
and only if the following inequalities hold:P
t i2T i
p (t ijti) [ui (C; t)  ui (A; t)]  (t) > 0
8i = 1; : : : ; n; 8ti 2 Ti:
(3)
We conclude that the set  n consists of all mappings from T into [0; 1] which satisfy
inequalities (2) and (3). Similarly,  1 coincides with the set of mappings from T into [0; 1]
which satisfy inequality (2) and the following inequality:
P
t i2T i
p (t ijti) [ui (A; t)  ui (C; t)] (1   (t)) > 0
8i = 1; : : : ; n; 8ti 2 Ti:
(4)
Clearly, inequality (2) implies neither inequality (3) nor inequality (4). In particular,
there may exist outcomes that belong to  2 but do not belong to  1 or to  n: 
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The proof of Proposition 1 is rather intuitive. Consider an outcome implementable with
deliberations under the voting rule r = 2; : : : ; n   1: As we pointed out in Section 2.1,
this outcome can be implemented with a communication protocol (a cheap talk extension)
in which the jurors truthfully reveal their types to an impartial mediator who disperses
recommendations to all jurors. Each prole of recommended actions corresponds, through
r; to one of the two social alternatives. Consider then a modication of this protocol which
prescribes to each prole of private reports a unanimous recommendation to the jurors
matching the social alternative that would have resulted in the original protocol. Since
1 < r < n; any unilateral deviation will not alter the outcome, and so equilibrium incentives
are maintained. In particular, the modied protocol generates an implementable outcome
coinciding with the one we started with. Moreover, since all recommendations are unanimous,
this remains an equilibrium outcome for any voting rule r0 = 2; : : : ; n   1: The equivalence
of all intermediate threshold rules follows.
In fact, in the proof of Proposition 1 we derive the full characterization of equilibria sets
corresponding to rules r = 2; :::; n  1; which is given by the set of inequalities (2).
With voting rules 1 and n (unanimity) it is generally possible to implement only a subset
of the outcomes that can be implemented with the \intermediate" voting rules r = 2; ::; n 1.
Intuitively, consider rst the unanimity rule r = n. Any outcome generated with unanimity
can be implemented via a mediator who dispels unanimous recommendations as above. Just
like all of the intermediate voting rules, when the recommendation is for everyone to vote for
acquittal, no one juror has an incentive to deviate, since her deviation cannot aect the nal
outcome. However, when the recommendation is to cast a vote for conviction, a unilateral
deviation can in fact alter the nal decision under unanimity, and an additional constraint
needs to be satised for jurors to obey such a recommendation. This supplementary condition
identies outcomes corresponding to unanimity as a subset of the outcomes generated by
any of the intermediate voting rules. Similar intuition holds for the inclusion of outcomes
generated by voting rule r = 1: Formally, these additional constraints are derived in the
proof and given by inequalities (3) and (4).
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3. Restricting Protocols and Strategies
In this section, we illustrate the robustness of our preliminary result. First, we show that
the equivalence does not require extremely complex communication protocols. In fact, re-
stricting communication to take place publicly in one round, maintains the equivalence, even
when there is no mediating party. Second, we demonstrate the robustness of the result to
stronger assumptions on voters' behavior, crossing out the potential use of weakly dominated
strategies.
3.1 Public Communication
Throughout Section 2 we have assumed that each juror can communicate privately with
a trustworthy mediator. However, in many group decisions, particularly in juries, a reliable
mediator is not available and the agents can only exchange messages with each other. In
addition, there are cases, like jury deliberations, in which an individual cannot communicate
with only some of her fellow decision makers. In juries, during deliberations communication
is public and every message is observed by all the jurors. In this section we investigate how
these restrictions aect our results.
Given a voting rule r; we dene a cheap talk extension with public communication of
Gr as follows. After learning their types, the jurors undergo a nite number of rounds of
communication. In each round one or more individuals send a message to all jurors. At the
end of the communication phase, the jurors cast their votes simultaneously and the chosen
alternative is C (i.e., the defendant is convicted) if r or more jurors vote c (convict).
Notice that outcomes induced by sequential equilibria of cheap talk extensions with public
communication of Gr are included in  r; r = 1; : : : ; n: In fact, any outcome that can be
implemented without a mediator can be also implemented with a mediator. Proposition
2 illustrates that the opposite inclusion holds for r = 2; : : : ; n   1; even when the public
communication phase is restricted to only one round.
Proposition 2 Consider the voting rule r = 2; : : : ; n  1: Any outcome in  r can be imple-
mented (in sequential equilibrium) with one round of public communication.
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In the proof of Proposition 2 we show that any outcome in  r; r = 2; : : : ; n   1; can
be implemented with a communication protocol in which the jurors publicly announce their
types. In addition, two jurors (say jurors 1 and 2) also announce two real numbers in the
unit interval. These numbers allow the jurors to coordinate their votes. In equilibrium, all
jurors truthfully reveal their information. Jurors 1 and 2 choose their numbers randomly,
according to the uniform distributions. The two numbers generate a jointly controlled lottery
that determines the nal outcome (A or C) as a function of the announced types.12 At the
voting stage all jurors vote in favor of the chosen alternative.
Notice that the specic communication protocol introduced in the proof of Proposition
2 could be used to implement the entire set of sequential equilibrium outcomes, regardless
of the (intermediate) threshold voting rule. This result is reminiscent of the construction
introduced by Forges [1990], in which one universal mechanism serves to implement the equi-
librium outcomes of all noncooperative games with incomplete information and at least four
players. This observation is important from the point of view of mechanism design. Indeed,
consider a designer who aims at implementing a certain feasible outcome. To accomplish
this, the designer should do two things. First, she should nd a cheap talk extension with
an equilibrium that induces the desired outcome. Second, the designer should induce the
agents to play that equilibrium. Our analysis shows that, without loss of generality, the
designer can use the communication protocol described in the proof of Proposition 2 and
restrict attention to the problem of inducing agents to play the desired equilibrium.13
An immediate consequence of Proposition 2 is that the results in Proposition 1 extend to
the case of public communication. Suppose that a reliable mediator is not available and the
jurors can only exchange public messages. Then all intermediate voting rules are equivalent.
Moreover, any outcome that can be implemented with the voting rules r = 1; n can be also
implemented with the intermediate voting rules.
12A jointly controlled lottery is a communication procedure that allows two or more players to select
an outcome randomly according to a given probability distribution. The lottery is robust to unilateral
deviations. See the proof of Proposition 2 for details.
13See Gerardi and Yariv [2005] for an analysis of a particular mechanism design problem of this form.
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3.2 Weakly Undominated Strategies
Consider a jury with twelve members. Suppose that the jurors do not have any private
information. Furthermore, nine jurors prefer to acquit the defendant and three jurors prefer
to convict her.14 According to Propositions 1 and 2, if the jurors can communicate, all
intermediate voting rules implement the same set of outcomes. In particular, any probability
distribution between acquittal and conviction is a sequential equilibrium outcome under the
voting rules r = 2; : : : ; 11:
Suppose now that the jurors do not use weakly dominated strategies. Are all intermediate
voting rules still equivalent? It is not dicult to see that the answer is negative. Consider a
juror who prefers acquittal. Clearly, any strategy under which the juror votes to convict is
weakly dominated. If her vote is not pivotal the juror is indierent between voting to acquit
and to convict. On the other hand, if her vote is pivotal the juror has a strict incentive to
vote to acquit. Similarly, a juror who prefers conviction and does not use weakly dominated
strategies will never vote to acquit. In this simple example communication does not play any
role. Under the voting rule r = 1; : : : ; 3 (r = 4; : : : ; 12) the equilibrium outcome is unique
and the defendant is convicted (acquitted) with probability one.
Certainly, if one is willing to entertain the idea that individuals care about their vote
coinciding with the selected alternative, then our equivalence result holds directly with un-
dominated strategies. For example, suppose that every juror has the following lexicographic
preferences. If her vote aects the nal outcome, the juror's preferences are identical to the
preferences described in Section 2.1. If her vote does not inuence the nal outcome, the
juror prefers to vote in favor of the winning alternative. It is easy to check that the strategies
employed in the proof of Proposition 2 are weakly undominated.
In this section we take a dierent route to ruling out weakly dominated strategies.
Namely, we show that under a few weak assumptions on the preference and information
14In this example we assume that the jurors have \partisan" preferences. Of course, partisan preferences
are more appropriate in environments dierent from juries (for example, an election with two candidates).
Here we follow our terminology and frame the example in the context of the jury model.
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structure, the results of Proposition 1 extend to the case of weakly undominated strategies.
In particular, we show that any outcome in  r; r = 2; : : : ; n   1; can be implemented with
a cheap talk extension and a sequential equilibrium that does not use dominated strategies.
To simplify the exposition and the proof of Proposition 3 below, we assume the presence
of an impartial mediator who helps the jurors communicate.15 For any voting rule r; we
consider cheap talk extensions in which the jurors communicate with one another and with
the mediator.
In games with incomplete information (as the ones we are considering) there are two
dierent notions of dominance: ex-ante dominance and interim dominance (see Fudenberg
and Tirole [1991], pages 226-229). Ex-ante domination requires that all types of a juror have
the same beliefs about the play of the other jurors. In contrast, interim domination allows
dierent types to have dierent beliefs. As is well known, it is easier for a strategy to be
interim weakly undominated than ex-ante weakly undominated. In this section we restrict
attention to the stronger notion of ex-ante undominated strategies.
Formally, consider a voting rule r and cheap talk extension of Gr: Let i = (i (ti))ti2Ti
denote a (possibly mixed) strategy of juror i; where i (ti) indicates the actions that juror i
chooses when her type is ti: By a slight abuse of notation, we will extend the domain of ui
and let ui (i (ti) ;  i (t i) ; t) denote the expected utility of juror i when the prole of types
is t and the jurors use the strategies (i (ti) ;  i (t i)):
Denition 1 The strategy i is ex-ante weakly undominated for juror i if there does not
exist a strategy ^i such that
X
ti
p (ti)
X
t i
p (t i j ti) [ui (^i (ti) ;  i (t i) ; t)  ui (i (ti) ;  i (t i) ; t)] > 0;
for every strategy prole  i and with at least one strict inequality.
We let  ^r denote the sets of outcomes induced by sequential equilibria of cheap talk
15The equivalence result with weakly undominated strategies holds even when a mediator is not available.
See our discussion following Proposition 3 below.
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extensions of Gr in which the jurors do not use ex-ante weakly dominated strategies. In
order to characterize the set  ^r; we need to make the following assumptions.
A1 (Informational Smallness) For every juror i = 1; : : : ; n and every alternative x =
A;C; there exists a prole of types tx i in T i such that ui
 
x; ti; t
x
 i

> ui
 
y; ti; t
x
 i

;for
every ti 2 Ti; y 6= x:
A2 (Informational Signicance) For every juror i = 1; : : : ; n and every pair of types ti;
t0i in Ti, there exists a prole of types t
(ti;t0i)
 i in T i such that
ui

x; ti; t
(ti;t0i)
 i

> ui

y; ti; t
(ti;t0i)
 i

;
ui

y; t0i; t
(ti;t0i)
 i

> ui

x; t0i; t
(ti;t0i)
 i

;
where x; y = A;C and x 6= y:
Assumption A1 guarantees that each juror would benet from the information available
to her opponents. In some sense, this assumption implies that each juror is \information-
ally small".16 A juror's information is not sucient for her to conclude which alternative
is optimal. Intuitively, Assumption A1 is crucial for the equivalence result to hold with
undominated strategies, since it allows us to rule out those situations in which some jurors
always prefer one of the alternatives over the other, regardless of the realized types of her
opponents.
On the other hand, assumption A2 ensures that a juror's information is never useless.
There is always a situation in which two types of the same juror prefer dierent alternatives.
In practice, the process of voir dire exercised in the American court system is eectively
intended to assure that assumptions A1 and A2 hold for trial jurors. Indeed, voir dire is used
to select jurors that are suciently unbiased so as to consider the case at hand fairly, based
16Note that A1 is qualitatively dierent from the concept of informational smallness introduced by McLean
and Postlewaite [2002] in that it is not probabilistic. In fact, for any i; the probability the realized types
satisfy A1 can be arbitrarily close to 0:
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only on the evidence presented in court. Technically, assumptions A1 and A2 are satised
by most models studied in the literature. The following example illustrates the restrictions
they impose on the standard jury model.
Example 4 Consider the standard jury setup with n jurors (Example 1). Recall that
 (k; n) denotes the posterior probability that the defendant is guilty when k out of n
jurors observe the guilty signal G: It is simple to verify that Assumptions A1 and A2
are satised as long as qi 2 ( (1; n) ;  (n  1; n)) for every juror i: Note that jurors'
preferences may dier by quite a margin. For example, for a jury of size n = 12;
prior P (I) = P (G) = 1
2
; and signal accuracy of p = 2
3
; we have (1) = 0:000976 and
(n  1) = 0:999024:
We are now ready to characterize the sets  ^2; : : : ;  ^n 1 and show that our equivalence
result holds even with ex-ante weakly undominated strategies.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumptions A1 and A2 hold. Then for every r = 2; : : : ; n 1;
 ^r =  r:
Intuitively, assume that Assumptions A1 and A2 hold. Clearly,  ^r   r: The proof of
Proposition 3 demonstrates the inclusion  ^r   r: The proof species a set of messages
for each juror i of the form Mi  Ti: The sets Mi are determined so that their intersection
contains only one word m. Roughly speaking, for every juror i there is a prole of her
opponents's strategies that make her pivotal only when their types are either tA i or t
C
 i
(specied in A1): Moreover, for every juror i there is a prole of strategies of her opponents
such that i strictly prefersm to any other message inMi: If everyone sendsm; the mediator
transmits a unanimous recommendation to play the action that the equilibrium outcome
at hand associates with the vector of types. This specication assures that sending m
and a truthful type report and then obeying the mediator's recommendation is indeed an
undominated strategy, which yields the desired outcome.17
17In Proposition 3 we focus on ex-ante weakly undominated strategies. Clearly, with interim weakly
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Taken together, Propositions 1 and 3 imply that when Assumptions A1 and A2 are
satised and communication is allowed, all intermediate voting rules are equivalent even
if the jurors can only use weakly undominated strategies. Furthermore, it is possible to
implement more outcomes under non unanimous voting rules than under unanimous ones.
In this section, we have assumed that the jurors can communicate with an impartial me-
diator. This assumption was made only to simplify the exposition of the proof of Proposition
3. However, the assumption is not crucial and our equivalence result extends to the case in
which an impartial mediator is not available. In fact, by using a communication protocol
similar to the one introduced in Gerardi [2004], it is possible to show that if there are at
least ve jurors and Assumptions A1 and A2 hold, then any outcome in  r; r = 2; : : : ; n 1;
can be implemented with a sequential equilibrium in undominated strategies of a cheap talk
extension with direct communication (for the sake of brevity, we omit the details).
In order to test the robustness of the equivalence result, we have considered sequential
equilibria in weakly undominated strategies. However, another route would be to adopt a
stronger solution concept. Austen-Smith and Feddersen [2002a, b] use a concept which has
the avor of perfect equilibrium. Specically, Austen-Smith and Feddersen require that the
equilibrium voting behavior of each participant remains optimal even when there is a small
probability that her opponents cast the wrong ballots. One diculty associated with adopt-
ing a similar solution concept in our setup comes from the fact that we consider arbitrary
forms of communication. Unfortunately, the literature on games with communication has
not yet developed enough of a technical apparatus to deal with perfect equilibria. In fact,
the characterization of the outcomes induced by perfect equilibria of arbitrary cheap talk
extensions is still an open question (the research frontier is probably Dhillon and Mertens
[1996], who provide an answer only for two-person games with complete information). We
are thus less optimistic about nding general results when concentrating on this particular
equilibrium notion at this point in time.
undominated strategies it is easier to implement every outcome in  r; r = 2; : : : ; n   1: In particular,
Assumption A1 is a sucient condition.
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4. Deliberative Voting with More than Two Alternatives
This section replicates the construction introduced in Section 2 for a general set of alterna-
tives and a general set of allowable actions for each participant.
Consider a group of n > 3 individuals, whom we will refer to as voters, that has to
select one of K > 2 alternatives from A  fA1; A2; : : : ; AKg. As before, each voter i has a
type ti which is private information. We denote by Ti the set of voter i's types, and assume
that Ti is nite. We let T =
Qn
i=1 Ti denote the set of type proles. The prior probability
distribution over T is denoted by p: As before, we assume that p has full support. A voter's
utility depends on the prole of types and the chosen alternative. Formally, for each voter i
there exists a function ui : A T ! R.
A collective choice structure on fn; T;A; fuigni=1g constitutes of two elements:
1. The set of available actions. We denote by Vi the actions available to voter i and by
V  V1  V2  : : : Vn the set of all possible action proles.
2. A voting rule, which is a mapping  : V ! (A): Without loss of generality, we
assume that any alternative can be selected, that is,
S
v2V
supp  (v) = A:
The collective choice structure (V;  ) denes an analogous Bayesian game GV; to that
dened in Section 2.1: Nature selects a prole of types in T according to the probability dis-
tribution p; then voters learn their types, after which they vote simultaneously. If the proles
of types and actions are t and v; respectively, voter i obtains
P
Ak2A  (Akjv)ui (Ak; t) :
In order to capture outcomes of the voting procedure with communication, we look at
cheap talk extensions of GV; : Voters exchange messages after learning their types, but before
simultaneously casting their votes. We will present the case in which a reliable mediator is
handy.18
A strategy prole  of a cheap talk extension of GV; induces an outcome, a mapping 
from the set of types T into the simplex (A). The vector  (t) denotes the probability
18As before, this assumption is made solely for the sake of presentation simplicity, and could be discarded
without aecting the reported results.
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distribution over collective outcomes when the prole of types is t (and the voters adopt the
strategy prole ). We let  V; denote the set of outcomes induced by sequential equilibria
of cheap talk extensions of GV; : As in Section 2.1, we characterize the set  V; using the
notion of communication equilibria. A mapping  from T into  (V ) ; the set of probability
distributions over V , is a communication equilibrium of GV; if and only if the following
inequalities hold:
P
t i2T i
p (t ijti)
P
v2V
 (vjt) P
Ak2A
 (Akjv)ui (Ak; t) >
P
t i2T i
p (t ijti)
P
v2V
 (vjt i; t0i)
P
Ak2A
 (Akjv i; i(vi))ui (Ak; t)
8i = 1; : : : ; n; 8 (ti; t0i) 2 T 2i ; 8i : Vi ! Vi:
The set  V; coincides with the set of outcomes induced by communication equilibria of
GV; :
 V; = f : T ! (A)j9 a communication equilibrium  of GV; 
such that  (Akjt) =
P
v2V
 (vjt) (Akjv) for every t 2 T; for every Ak 2 Ag:
In the case of two alternatives, a crucial aspect of the equivalence result was the ability
to replicate any equilibrium outcome with strategy proles that were robust to unilateral
deviations (via unanimous proles). We will therefore replicate the construction illustrating
the equivalence result for the class of veto-free collective choice structures in which no one
agent has the power to overturn a choice for all circumstances. Formally,
Denition 2 (Veto-Free Structures) The collective choice structure (V;  ) is veto-free if
for every Ak in A, there exists a prole v 2 V such that for any i = 1; : : : ; n; and any
v0i 2 Vi;  (Akjv i; v0i) = 1:
That is, the collective choice structure is veto-free if for every alternative, there is a
prole of actions that would yield that alternative with probability one, even if one of the
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committee members deviates. For example, all of the intermediate threshold voting rules
discussed in Section 2 are veto-free. The following examples identify most of the well-known
multiple alternative voting rules as part of a veto-free collective choice structure (see, e.g.,
Cox [1987] and references therein).19
Examples (Scoring Rules, Alternative Voting, and Condorcet structures)
1. Generalized Scoring Rules. A scoring rule is characterized by a set of scores
f!kgKk=1  R. Without loss of generality, we will suppose that there exists a k > 1 such
that !1 > !2 > : : : > !k > !k+1 > : : : > !K : Each voter i's action set can be written
as Vi = f(1; 2; : : : ; K) : (1; 2; : : : ; K) is a permutation of (!1; !2; : : : ; !K)g: So a
voter reports an allocation of scores to the entire set of candidates. The candidate is
then chosen according to:
 score(Aljv) =
8><>:
1
jargmaxk
nP
i=1
vi(k)j
l 2 argmaxk
nP
i=1
vi(k)
0 otherwise
:
The scoring rule f!kgKk=1 is veto-free if, for example,
n!1   n div (K   1)
KX
k=2
!k  
n mod (K 1)X
k=2
!k > 2(!1   !K)
where n div k denotes the integer part of n
k
and n mod k  n   k  (n div k); the
remainder of n when divided by k:
Some of the scoring rules that are commonly used are in fact veto-free:
Plurality. When !1 = 1 and !2 = : : : = !K = 0; the scoring rule is equivalent to
the plurality rule. We will denote the equilibria outcomes of the plurality election
with communication by  Plurality:
19We omit some immediate proofs which appear in Gerardi and Yariv [2003].
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Borda Rule. The scores !1 = K   1; !2 = K   2; : : : ; !K = 0; correspond to the
Borda method of electing an alternative. These scores satisfy the condition for
a veto-free structure as well, as long as n > 4. We will denote the equilibria
outcomes of the Borda election with communication by  Borda:
2. Alternative Voting.20 In the Alternative Voting collective choice structure, each voter
reports a strict rank order of the alternatives, that is
Vi = f2 AA : for all k 6= k0; Ak  Ak0 or Ak0  Ak and  is transitiveg:
The voting rule  AV (v) is dened through a recursive process. Top preference alter-
natives are tallied. The candidate with lowest count is eliminated and the votes are
reconsidered as restricted orderings over the remaining K   1 candidates. The process
is repeated until one candidate has received half the votes as the most preferred. At
each stage, a tie leads to a uniform randomization between the tied candidates. We will
denote the set of equilibria corresponding to Alternative Voting with communication
by  AV :
3. Condorcet Winner. In the Condorcet collective choice structure, each voter reports a
strict rank order of the alternatives as in Alternative Voting:
Vi = f2 AA : for all k 6= k0; Ak  Ak0 or Ak0  Ak and  is transitiveg:
The voting rule  Condorcet(v) is dened as follows. For each pair of candidates, it is
resolved how many agents preferred each candidate over the other by counting whether
they were higher ranked in the reported preference ordering. If any candidate k is
preferred to all other candidates, they are declared the winner and  Condorcet(Akjv) = 1:
If there is no winner, a top cycle is determined. A top cycle is a subset of candidates
20Alternative Voting, commonly referred to as instant runo voting, is rarely used in the U.S., but has
actually been adopted as means of electing local candidates in San Francisco. In addition, it is used to elect
the House of Representatives in Australia.
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such that each of the members will beat all candidates outside the top cycle in pair-
wise competition, but not all of the candidates within the top cycle. There are several
ways that the literature considers for choosing one candidate as the winner from the
top cycle: by uniform randomization, by Alternative Voting within the top cycle, or by
choosing the candidate who, in the pair-wise competition she does worst in, loses by
the least amount (and randomize upon a tie). All these specications yield a veto-free
structure. We will consider Alternative Voting to take place whenever a runo vote
is necessary and denote the corresponding set of equilibria, when communication is
possible, by  Condorcert:
We are now ready to compare the sets  V; and  V 0; 0 for two dierent collective choice
structures (V;  ) and (V 0;  0): Proposition 4 shows that all veto-free collective choice struc-
tures are equivalent. If voters can communicate, every outcome that can be implemented
with a veto-free structure (V;  ) can also be implemented with a dierent veto-free structure
(V 0;  0): Furthermore, by adopting a non veto-free structure, we cannot enlarge the set of
equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 4 For any veto-free structures (V;  ) and (V 0;  0);  V; =  V 0; 0 : Moreover,
if ( ~V ; ~ ) is not veto-free, then   ~V ;~   V; :
The formal proof of Proposition 4 follows the lines of that of Proposition 1, and is thereby
omitted. Intuitively, assume (V;  ) and (V 0;  0) are collective choice structures and assume
that (V;  ) is veto-free. Consider an outcome implementable with communication under
the collective choice structure (V 0;  0): The revelation principle implies that this equilibrium
outcome can be implemented with a communication protocol in which voters truthfully reveal
their types to an impartial mediator who disperses recommendations to all voters. Each
prole of recommended actions corresponds, through  0; to one of the possible alternatives.
Contemplate a modication of this mapping which prescribes to each prole of private reports
a prole of recommendations in V that corresponds, via  ; to the social alternative that would
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have resulted in the original protocol corresponding to (V 0;  0). Moreover, since (V;  ) is veto-
free, the prole of recommendations can be assumed to be robust to unilateral deviations.
In particular, the modied protocol generates an implementable outcome in  V; coinciding
with the one we started with in  V 0; 0 . Hence  V 0; 0   V; : If (V 0;  0) is veto-free as well, the
reverse inclusion is achieved and  V; =  V 0; 0 . Our generalized equivalence result follows.
Since Plurality, Borda, Alternative Voting, and Condorcet collective choice structures are
all veto-free when n > 4, it follows from Proposition 4 that they all yield they same set of
equilibrium outcomes once communication is introduced. Formally, if we assume that the
committee is comprised of at least four members,
Corollary  Plurality =  Borda =  AV =  Condorcet:
Note that similar analysis to that provided in Section 3.1 would assure the generalized
equivalence result to hold with unmediated communication and only one round of public
deliberations. Moreover, mild restrictions on voters' preferences, as introduced in Section
3.2, would provide the equivalence result when voters use weakly undominated strategies.
5. Conclusions
The main insight coming out of our current inquiry is that communication between indi-
viduals in collective choice scenarios has a fundamental impact on the resulting equilibrium
outcomes. In particular, in a generalized voting setup, deliberations render all veto-free rules
equivalent with respect to the sequential equilibrium outcomes they generate. This result is
robust to several restrictions on the communication protocols themselves (e.g., one round,
public communication), and, under a couple of mild assumptions, when voters are conned
to using weakly undominated strategies.
Our analysis illustrates the importance of modeling communication in collective choice
environments. It is important to note that when the format of communication is xed,
predictions across voting institutions may, in fact, dier. Therefore, producing a working
model of debates and deliberations may be crucial in selecting institutions in particular
environments. We view this as an important avenue for future research.
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As a particular example, our results suggest the need for future theoretical work to explain
the empirical diversity of voting institutions in the jury arena. Indeed, when there are no
restrictions on the way jurors can deliberate, the theory implies that predictions of outcomes
across a wide range of institutions should be identical.
From a design point of view, our equivalence observation may prove particularly im-
portant. Indeed, the plausibility of communication makes the problem of a social planner
designing a jury system (or a principal choosing a committee, for that matter) one of equilib-
rium selection, rather than pure institutional design via the voting rule itself. The analysis
in this paper opens a broad set of questions related to the choice of committees (in terms of
their size and preference distribution) as well as the specication of communication protocols.
Regarding equilibrium notions, while we succeeded in identifying conditions for the equiv-
alence result to hold when voters are using weakly undominated strategies, it would be in-
teresting to go even further and investigate how institutional outcomes change when voters
make mistakes, and realize their opponents may be doing so as well. One way to start such
an endeavor would be to look at a stronger equilibrium concept, such as trembling hand
perfect equilibrium. Unfortunately, as of yet, there are scarcely any general results in the
literature characterizing trembling hand perfect equilibria in games with communication.
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6. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Let  be an outcome in  r: Consider the following game. In stage 1; all jurors simultane-
ously send a public message. The set of messages of juror i = 1; 2 is Ti  [0; 1] (i.e., jurors 1
and 2 announce their types and a number in the unit interval). The set of messages of juror
i = 3; : : : ; n is equal to Ti (i.e., jurors 3; : : : ; n announce their types). In stage 2 the jurors
cast their votes.
Consider the following strategy prole. In stage 1; all jurors reveal their types truth-
fully. Furthermore; both juror 1 and juror 2 randomly select a number in the unit interval,
according to the uniform distribution.
Finally, let us describe how the jurors vote in stage 2: Suppose that the vector of types
announced in stage 1 is t: Let zi, i = 1; 2; denote the number announced by juror i: Let
 : [0; 1]2 ! [0; 1] denote the following function of z1 and z2 :
 (z1; z2) =
(
z1 + z2 if z1 + z2 6 1
z1 + z2   1 if z1 + z2 > 1
:
If  (z1; z2) 6  (t) all jurors vote to convict. If  (z1; z2) >  (t) all jurors vote to acquit.
Of course, this strategy prole induces the outcome : It is also easy to check that
our strategy prole is a sequential equilibrium (consistent beliefs can be derived from any
sequence of completely mixed strategy proles converging to the equilibrium prole). Clearly,
a juror does not have a protable deviation in stage 2 since her vote does not aect the nal
outcome. By announcing two numbers in the unit interval jurors 1 and 2 perform a jointly
controlled lottery which determines how the jurors will vote. Since z1 is independent of
z2 and uniformly distributed,  (z1; z2) is also independent of z2 and uniformly distributed.
Thus juror 2 is indierent between all numbers in [0; 1] (of course, the same argument can be
applied to juror 1). Finally, the vector of types announced by the jurors determines which
lottery will be used in the second step of the game. Inequalities in (2) guarantee that each
juror has an incentive to be sincere provided that all her opponents behave likewise. 
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Proof of Proposition 3
Fix r = 2; : : : ; n  1: To prove Proposition 3 it is enough to show that  r   ^r. Assume
that Assumptions A1 and A2 hold and x an outcome  in  r: Consider the following cheap
talk extension. In stage 1 all jurors report their messages simultaneously to the mediator.
Each juror i sends a message that has two components. The rst component is her type.
The second component is an element of the set Mi dened by:
Mi = f0; 1a; 1b; : : : ; (i  1) a; (i  1) b; (i+ 1) a; (i+ 1) b; : : : ; na; nbg :
In other words, juror i sends a message from the set Ti Mi: We let mi 2 Mi denote the
second component of the message sent by juror i:
For each vector of reports, the mediator selects an action prole in V = fa; cgn according
to some probability distribution (specied below) and informs each juror only of her own
action. Finally, jurors vote and an alternative is selected according to the voting rule r:
Consider the following specication of the mediator's choice of an action prole. We
distinguish between three cases:
 Suppose that mj = ia; for some i = 1; : : : ; n and for each juror j 6= i: Let t i denote the
prole of types reported by the jurors dierent from i (t i is an element of T i). In this
case, the mediator randomly selects an alternative, A or C; with equal probabilities.
First, suppose that alternative A is selected. If t i = tA i; the mediator recommends
action a to juror i and to the rst n   r jurors dierent from i (i.e., the mediator
recommends a to n   r + 1 jurors) and action c to every other juror. If t i 6= tA i;
the mediator recommends action a to all jurors. Suppose now that alternative C is
selected. If t i = tC i; the mediator recommends action c to juror i and to the rst r 1
jurors dierent from i and action a to every other juror. If t i 6= tC i; the mediator
recommends action c to all jurors.
 Suppose that for some i = 1; : : : ; n; mj = ib; for all jurors j 6= i: Let ti denote the type
reported by juror i and t i the prole of types reported by the jurors dierent from i:
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If mi = 0; the mediator selects (with probability one) the alternative that is optimal
for juror i when the prole of types is (ti; t i) (if both alternatives are optimal, the
mediator selects A). Let h (ti; t i) denote this alternative. If mi 6= 0; the mediator
selects the alternative dierent from h (ti; t i) : In any case, the mediator recommends
to every juror to vote in favor of the chosen alternative.
 Finally, in all other cases, the mediator selects alternatives A and C with probabilities
1   (t) and  (t) ; respectively (where t is the prole of types reported by the jurors).
The mediator recommends to every juror to vote in favor of the chosen alternative.
Consider now the following strategy for jurors i = 1; : : : ; n. Every type ti reports the
message (ti; 0) and always obeys the mediator's recommendation (even when she reports a
message dierent from (ti; 0)). Let 

i denote this strategy. Of course, the strategy prole
(1; : : : ; 

n) induces the outcome : It is also easy to show that we can nd a system of beliefs
(1; : : : ; 

n) such that the assessment ((

1; : : : ; 

n) ; (

1; : : : ; 

n)) constitutes a sequential
equilibrium of our game. It is enough to take a sequence of completely mixed strategy
proles which converges to (1; : : : ; 

n) and such that for each juror i = 1; : : : ; n; deviations
to messages with the second component in the set f1a; : : : ; (i  1) a; (i+ 1) a; : : : ; nag are
much less likely than other deviations. This implies that in every information set a juror
assigns probability zero to the event that her vote is pivotal (we omit the details). Sequential
rationality of the assessment ((1; : : : ; 

n) ; (

1; : : : ; 

n)) trivially follows.
To complete our proof, we need to show that for each juror i = 1; : : : ; n; the strategy i
is ex-ante weakly undominated. Of course, a strategy for juror i species for each type ti the
message that ti sends and an action for every pair of recommendations and message (even
the messages that were not sent). However, for our purposes it is enough to consider the
reduced representation and restrict attention to the actions corresponding to the message
actually sent.
Let S (ti) denote the set of pure strategies of type ti in which ti does not always obey the
mediator's recommendation. Denote by S 0 (ti) the set of pure strategies of ti in which ti sends
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a message dierent from (ti; 0) and then obeys the mediator's recommendation. Consider
any strategy i of juror i dierent from 

i : At least one of the following two alternatives
is true: (i) there exists a type t^i such that i
 
t^i

assigns positive probability to a strategy
in the set S
 
t^i

; (ii) there exists a type t^i such that i
 
t^i

assigns positive probability to a
strategy in the set S 0
 
t^i

:
Start with case (i). Consider the strategy prole of jurors dierent from i in which every
type tj of juror j 6= i sends the message (tj; ia) and then obeys the mediator's recommenda-
tion. It follows from assumption A1 that against this strategy prole, type t^i strictly prefers
the strategy i
 
t^i

to the strategy i
 
t^i

. Moreover, assumption A1 also implies that for
every other type ti the strategy 

i (ti) is weakly better than the strategy i (ti).
For case (ii), consider the strategy prole in which every type tj of juror j 6= i sends
the message (tj; ib) and then is obedient. Denote this prole by 
0
 i and consider type t^i: It
follows from assumption A2 that against 0 i; the strategy 

i
 
t^i

is strictly better than any
pure strategy in which t^i sends a message (ti; 0) ; where ti 6= t^i: Furthermore, assumption A1
implies that against 0 i; 

i
 
t^i

is strictly better than any pure strategy in which t^i sends
a message (ti;mi) ; where mi 6= 0 and ti 2 Ti: Of course, against 0 i disobedience is not
benecial. Thus, t^i strictly prefers 

i
 
t^i

to i
 
t^i

: Finally, assumptions A1 and A2 also
imply that against 0 i any other type ti weakly prefers 

i (ti) to i (ti) : 
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